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The Asian financial crisis is doubly unfortunate,  first of all because it has set income and wealth  levels 
in these countries  back some ten years. But, it is also unfortunate  because had Hy Minsky been alive 
to point  out to policy  makers that they were dealing with a debt deflation  the worst  excesses  might 
have been  prevented.  Those  of you  who  knew  Hy might  instantly  object  that  Hy knew  virtually 
nothing  about Asia. But, that has not stopped hundreds of our colleagues  from mistaking  what went 
wrong  in Asia. And in Hy’s case it probably would not have made much difference. Hy only claimed 
to be an expert  in one thing  -  the St. Louis Cardinals. But, I think we can make a good  guess at 
what he would  have said about the crisis, for it was a clear case of  the Minsky instability hypothesis, 
As you may remember, Hy spent a good  deal of time explaining why “It”, that  is, the Great 
Depression,  Can’t Happen  Again. But, in the case of Asia it did. And this is also a lesson for why it 
might  happen  again,  outside  the  Far  East.  First,  Hy  insisted  on  the  beneficial  impact  of  Big 
Government  in providing  a floor under aggregate  demand. Free falls in asset prices could not happen 
if  there  was  a  guaranteed  floor  under  incomes.  The  Bigger  the  Government,  the  firmer  that 
foundation  and the more stable the economy.  Not that this didn’t cause other problems, but it meant 
that you  could  only go down  so far. If we take  a look  at the vital statistics of the Asian economies, 
we see in general  that they have small governments.  And those  governments  tend to run persistent 
surpluses. There are no firm foundations here. This is not to say that government  played no role. We 
have heard a lot about “crony capitalism  in Asia. But, this sort of income support  does not provide 
the kind of aggregate  demand support that Hy thought  was beneficial to avoiding  instability. 
Hy also thought that a Big Bank, an active central bank willing to intervene actively by lending 
at  the  discount  window  in  support  of  asset  prices,  and  thus  of  bank  solvency,  was  of  crucial 
importance.  Hy did not believe in tying one’s hands or currency  boards  or other forms of shooting 
financial markets in the foot.  It is true that central banks are common in Asia, and in some countries 
they  are active  on the policy front.  But, in the current  crisis a major portion  of the  lending  to firms 
and financial  institutions  was in foreign  currency,  Yen and US dollars,  which meant  that  the  local 
central  bank  was  constrained  in its ability to  act  as lender  of last  resort  by the  size of  its  dollar 
reserves.  They could not follow the Bagehot  principle of lending without  limit. Of course,  they had 
the (non)-choice  of adopting  floating  exchange rates, but this would  have made their  ability to act 2 
that  much  weaker. 
Thus,  the two  basic  elements  that  preclude  financial  instability  and  have  prevented  “It”  from 
happening  in the  post-war  period,  were  both  absent  in the  Asia  economies.  Detailed  knowledge  of 
the region  would  not really have  been  necessary  to have  allowed  Hy to reach  the  conclusion  that  these 
economies  were  subject  to  financial  instability. 
But,  Hy  would  have  been  curious  to  discover  the  sources  of  the  financial  fragility  that 
produced  the  financial  breakdown  in the  Asian  region.  I think  he also  would  have  been  particularly 
critical  of  the  analysis  that  was  used  as the  basis  for  the  policy  conditions  that  were  attached  to 
international  support  measures  in the  aftermath  of the  crisis.  The  rest  of the  paper  seeks  to  outline 
these  two  points. 
-  Financial  Fragility  and  Development 
We  all know  the  aphorism  that  says bankers  should  only  lend  to  people  who  don’t  need  the  money. 
This  seems  to  reflect  the  experience  of most  developing  countries.  When  they  need  to  borrow,  they 
find  it difficult  to  do  so; but  when  they  are receiving  foreign  investment  funds  it is difficult  to  stop 
them  coming  in. What  the  aphorism  presumably  intends  to  convey  is that  bankers  should  only  lend 
against  good  collateral,  so that  their  loans  are secured  and credit  risk is reduced  to  a minimum.  But, 
as George  Soros  (1987,  p.  8 1) has pointed  out,  in financial  markets  based  on  expectations  of future 
values,  the very  act of lending  may  change  expectations  and thus  the “fair” value  of the  collateral  used 
to  secure  the  loan.  This  suggests  a positive  relation  between  the  value  of collateral  and  the  value  of 
the  loan  it secures  -  lending  may  strengthen  the  firm  and  thus  the  bank.  On  the  other  hand,  a firm 
that  fails to  secure  lending  may  have  to  enter  into  distress  sales or reduce  activity,  reducing  the  value 
of  its  assets  that  it  had  promised  as  collateral,  as  well  as  the  value  of  collateral  pledged  against 
outstanding  loans. 
It is interesting  that  while  this  positive  relation  seems  to  apply  to  individual  firms,  it does  not 
reflect  the  experiences  of developing  countries.  Here  the general  rule  has tended  to  be that  the  more 
that  is  lent,  the  lower  the  value  of  the  country’s  assets.  Why  has  lending  created  this  difficulty? 
Before,  Soros  had  become  a  household  name,  Hy  (e.g.  1975)  had  set  out  an analysis  of the  risks 
involved  in financial  leverage  that  may help to  explain why  Sores’s  proposition  tends  not  to  work  in 
many  developing  countries.  Minsky’s  analysis  is based  on the  sustainability  of cash  flows  generated 
by the  composition  of assets  and  liabilities  on  company  balance  sheets.  Borrowing  the  concept  of a “margin  of  safety”  from  Benjamin  Graham,  Minsky  defined  the  financing  of  a firm’s  operations  as 
“hedge”  finance  the  asset  side  of the  balance  sheet  produces  expected  cash  inflows  from  operating 
projects  that  always  exceed  the  financing  costs  and  operating  expenses,  including  dividends  for 
shareholders  on  the  liability  side  of the  balance  sheet,  by a sufficient  “margin  of  safety”  or  cushion 
capable  of absorbing  any unforeseen  changes  in cash  inflows  and  outflows. 
If  the  cushion  covered  say  2.33  standard  deviations  of  the  historical  data  on  past  gross 
operating  returns,  then  the  firm would  be unable  to meet  its cash flow  commitments  on average  only 
one  time  in one  hundred.  A company  that  is expected  to  meet  its payments  with  99%  probability  is 
close  to  what  the  banker’s  aphorism  means  when  it says it does  not  need  the  money. 
As  the  cushion  of  safety  declines  and  the  probability  of  being  unable  to  meet  cash  flow 
commitments  rises,  there  will be  a point  at which  it is 99%  probable  that  there  will  be  some  fkture 
periods  in which  the  cushion  will not  be sufficient  so that the  firm will not  be able to meet  its payment 
commitments.  Nonetheless,  the  cumulative  cushion  over  the life of the loan may be sufficient  to cover 
them,  so  that  the  project  has  a positive  net  present  value.  The  firm  may  need  an  extension  on 
occasion,  but  by the  end  of the  loan  it will have met  all interest  and principal  payments.  This  is what 
Minsky  calls a “speculative”  financing  position,  for both  the banker  and the  borrower  are speculating 
that  by the  end  of the  project  there  will be enough  money  to  repay  the  loan,  even  though  there  may 
be  shortfalls  along  the  way.  This  is really  what  we  have  in  mind  when  we  say that  bankers  should 
make  good  credit  assessments. 
Finally,  when  the  cushion  of safety  is non-existent  and there  is a high  probability  of shortfalls 
in nearly  every  period,  the  firm  may  have  to  borrow  additional  fkds  just  to  be  able to  meet  current 
commitments.  This  Minsky  calls  “Ponzi”  financing,  making  reference  to  a well-known  pyramid 
investment  scheme.  These  are  companies  that  need  to  increase  their  borrowing  just  to  stay  in 
business,  but  to  which,  according  to  the  aphorism  and  good  credit  assessment,  bankers  should  not 
lend  under  any  circumstances. 
Minsky  notes  that  in  a capitalist  economy  in  which  the  titure  cannot  be  predicted  and  is 
subject  to unforeseen  change,  the value  of the  financing  positions  put  in place  by bankers  will change 
with  variations  in macroeconomic  variables.  For  example,  a change  in domestic  monetary  policy  that 
causes  interest  rates  to rise has two  effects  on leveraged  financial  projects.  First,  it reduces  the  present 
values  of the  cash  flows  expected  to  be earned  from  operating  the  projects.  Second,  it increases  the 
cash  flow  commitments  for  financing  charges  when  lending  is  primarily  short-term  or  set  on  an 4 
adjustable  or rollover  basis.  For  a firm with  a high proportion  of imported  inputs,  or export  sales,  or 
foreign  borrowing,  a  depreciation  in  the  exchange  rate  will  have  the  same  effect  on  cash  flow 
commitments  as an increase  in interest  rates.  In addition,  it may  also  reduce  estimated  cash  flows  if 
import  costs  rise  by the  full amount  of the  devaluation,  while  export  prices  in foreign  currency  are 
reduced  in an attempt  to  increase  market  share  or  stimulate  rapid  sales.  For  countries  operating  in 
an open  trading  system  these  two  exogenous  changes  usually  occur  together  and reinforce  each  other 
since  higher  interest  are  often  used  to  defend  a weak  currency  and  to  stabilise  a  currency  after 
devaluation.  Cushions  of  safety  would  thus  have  to  be  larger  for  firms  operating  in countries  with 
open  capital  markets. 
For  some  borrowers  the  cushions  of safety  will not  be sufficiently  large  to  cover  exogenous 
changes  in both  interest  rates  and  exchange  rates  and  may  be  sufficient  to  transform  them  directly 
from  hedge  units  into  Ponzi  financing  units.  The  result  is an overall  increase  in the  lender’s  credit  risk 
on  outstanding  bank  loans,  since  the  borrower’s  cushion  of  safety  is now  smaller.  There  is also  an 
increase  in borrower’s  risk for the  firms  as they  find it more  difficult to realise  their  initially  expected 
cash  flows.  ThefragiZity  of the  domestic  financial  system  thus  increases  with  either  a rise  in interest 
rates,  or  a depreciation  of the  currency. 
Obviously,  this  same  reasoning  can be applied  to  domestic  banks  that  are allowed  to  borrow 
and/or  lend  in international  capital  markets.  They  will require  higher  cushions  of safety  to  cover  the 
possibility  of  changes  in international  interest  rates  or the  exchange  rate.  But,  a bank  is in an  even 
more  exposed  position.  A  rise  in  interest  rates  and  a depreciation  of  the  exchange  rate  not  only 
reduces  the  present  value  of its domestic  cash  flows  (represented  by the  interest  payments  received 
from  its  outstanding  domestic  loans)  and  increases  the  interest  costs  of  its foreign  funding,  it  also 
reduces  the  credit  quality  of its loans  and reduces  its own  credit  rating.  It will thus  have  to pay  higher 
credit  spreads  on its international  funding  which  it will be unable  to  recover  through  higher  interest 
rates  charged  to  its  domestic  clients.  If the  change  in rates  is sufficiently  large  banks  may  also  find 
themselves  suddenly  in  the  condition  of  a Ponzi  unit  in which  cash  inflows  no  longer  cover  cash 
outflows,  and  the  value  of  assets  no  longer  provides  cover  for  its liabilities  for  any future  date.  The 
net  present  value  of the  bank  falls below  zero  and  it becomes  technically  insolvent. 
The  natural  response  of a banker  would  be to  cut  down  on funding  costs  by reducing  lending 
to  firms  classified  as hedge  and  speculative  units  and  by calling  in lending  to  ponzi  financing  units. 
As  noted,  the  speculative  and  ponzi  firms  need  increased  finance  just  to  stay  in business.  But,  the 5 
bankers  may  have  no  choice  but  to  cut  off support  if the  banks  themselves  have  become  Ponzi  units; 
they  may  be forced  to  reduce  their  lending  because  their  own  finding  sources  refuse  to  roll  over  or 
extend  credits.  Obviously,  domestic  banks  will also be unwilling  to lend to  each  other,  so the  domestic 
interbank  market  will  also  contract,  leading  to  a generalised  difficulty  in  completing  payment  of 
current  cash  commitments.  As  both  firms  and  banks  attempt  to  reduce  their  foreign  currency 
exposure,  market  imbalances  may  occur,  leading  to  a breakdown  in the  foreign  exchange  market  as 
well.  As  a result  a financially  fragile  system  may  be transformed  into  a financially  unstable  system. 
In  such  conditions,  ponzi  financing  firms  have  no  choice  but  to  reduce  their  own  cash 
outflows,  delaying  current  payments  to  suppliers,  cutting  back  on  expenditures,  and  by  attempting 
to  raise  cash  by  selling  out  inventories,  and  what  output  they  can  continue  to  produce  with  current 
inventories  of inputs,  at distress  prices.  If this  is insufficient  to  cover  cash  flow  needs,  they  will  be 
forced  to  sell  any  other  assets  they  may  have,  or  to  generate  liquidity  by  suspending  current 
investment  projects  or  even  selling  capital  equipment.  They  will  also  layoff  or  fire  workers  who 
represent  a  cash  drain.  The  result,  in  contradiction  to  Say’s  Law  of  Markets,  is  a  generalised 
condition  of excess  supply  in all markets,  placing  downward  pressure  on  prices  of both  output  and 
assets.  Such  conditions  appear  peculiar  because  generalised  excess  supply  will also  be accompanied 
by  declining  overall  demand  (which  is usually  thought  to  rise  when  prices  fall)  as  a  result  of  the 
suspension  of investment  expenditures  by ponzi  firms,  the  general  decline  in investment  due  to  the 
tightening  of monetary  policy,  and  the  fall in consumption  caused  by the  fall in household  incomes 
and increased  unemployment.  This  will place  additional  pressure  on  short-term  money  markets,  and 
may even  push  short  rates  upwards  as credit  conditions  deteriorate,  current  payments  are delayed  and 
more  financing  units  seek  temporary  financing  to  keep  operating. 
-  Endogenous  Financial  Fragility 
There  is an alternative  means  of generating  the  same  results.  Rather  then  being  produced  by 
exogenous  changes  in economic  variables  that  render  cushions  of safety  insufficient  to  insure  stable 
expansion,  an endogenous  process  may lead to an underestimation  ofthe  risks  associated  with  certain 
investment  plans  and  thus  to  the  provision  of cushions  of safety  that  are too  thin.  This  may  occur  in 
periods  of economic  stability  in which  the weight  of past positive  experience  increases  the expectation 
of future  success,  and  the  memories  of past  crises  fade  from  the  collective  memories  of bankers  and 
managers.  This  reduction  in the  estimates  of probable  loss  will lead to  a reduction  in the  cushion  of 6 
safety  thought  to  be  prudent.  Usually  both  of these  process  work  together,  a “stable  environment” 
is  usually  characterised  as  a  period  without  major  external  shocks.  Thus  cushions  of  safety  are 
reduced  with  the  lowered  expectations  of  negative  shocks.  Usually  these  shocks  are  identified  in 
terms  of changes  in sales or financing  conditions.  But,  as noted  above,  changes  in exchange  rates  have 
a similar  impact  to  changes  in interest  rates.  Thus,  a period  of prolonged  exchange  rate  stability  may 
lead  to  over  optimistic  assessments  of  the  stability  of  the  domestic  currency  values  of  foreign 
commitments  and  similar  reduction  in  margins  of  safety  relating  to  foreign  cash  commitments  or 
inflows.  This  endogenous  change  in margins  makes  the  passage  from  a fragile  to  an unstable  system 
that  much  more  rapid  in the  event  of an exogenous  shock. 
This  combination  of events  in which  rising supplies  and falling  prices  leads  to  falling  demand 
(rather  than  demand  increasing  with  falling  price  as in the  traditional  analysis)  is what  Irving  Fisher 
called  a  “debt  deflation”  process.  Minsky’s  extension  of the  process  emphasises  the  fact  that  the 
rising  credit  risks  that  result  are reflected  on bank balance  sheets  in the  form  of increased  charge-offs 
and  a general  decline  in asset  quality  which  will  eventually  place  some  banks  in difficulty  as their 
capital cushion  is overwhelmed  by  loan  losses,  and a full fledged  financial  panic  is set off.  This spread 
of fragility  from  the productive  to the banking  sector  characterises  the passage  from  financial  fragility 
to  financial  instability  and  crisis. 
---The Minsky  Crisis in Asia 
Minsky’s  original  analysis  of the passage  from financial  fragility  to financial  instability  is based 
on  a change  in domestic  monetary  policy  or the  persistence  of  stable  domestic  conditions.  But,  as 
seen  above,  the  analysis  is easily  extended  to  an exogenous  shock  in exchange  rates  for  companies 
operating  in open  trading  systems  and to banks  borrowing  and lending  in international  markets.  With 
increasingly  interdependent  capital  markets  and  increased  capital  flows,  the  impact  of  a change  in 
monetary  policy  would  then  have  to  be  extended  to  a change  in the  monetary  policy  of the  largest 
international  lenders.  Changes  in interest  rates  of the  major  international  lenders,  especially  the  US 
and  Japan,  have  been  especially  important  in  creating  financial  instability  in  developing  countries 
during  the  debt  crises  of  the  1970s  and  198Os, and  are  a major  factor  in the  current  Asian  crisis. 
However,  the  current  crisis  has been  exacerbated  by an additional  element:  the  conditionality  on the 
lending  of the  multilateral  agencies. 7 
-  why Is  This Crisis D@erentfrom  Other Developing  Country  Debt  Crises? 
AS noted  above,  the  normal  scenario  for  a developing  country  financial  crisis  would  involve 
domestic  firms  borrowing  in foreign  currency  from  foreign  banks  at interest  rates  which  are reset  at 
a short  rollover  period.  Note  that  it makes  little  difference  if the  loans  have  a short  or long  maturity, 
the  point  is the  change  in interest  costs  on cash  flows  produced  by the  short  reset  interval  for  interest 
rates.  Short  reset  periods  mean  that  a rise  in foreign  interest  rates  is quickly  transformed  into  an 
increased  cash  flow  commitment  for the  borrower,  instantly  reducing  margins  of safety.  Ifthe  change 
in international  interest  rate  differentials  leads  to  a depreciation  of  the  domestic  currency  relative  to 
the  borrowed  foreign  currency,  then  the  cushion  of  safety  is further  eroded  by the  increase  in  the 
domestic  currency  value  of the  cash  commitments  and  the principal  to be repaid  at maturity.  Finally, 
if the  government  responds  to  the  weakness  of the  domestic  currency  in international  markets  by 
increasing  domestic  interest  rates  in  order  to  stem  currency  speculation  or  to  attempt  to  attract 
foreign  demand  for  the  currency,  domestic  demand  may  be  adversely  affected  and  domestic  cash 
flows  will  be  reduced  and  domestic  financing  costs  will be  increased.  Firms  may  thus  pass  rapidly 
from  hedge  financing  to  Ponzi  finance  units  as the  result  of a rise  in foreign  interest  rates.  Whether 
this increase  in financial  fragility  turns  to instability  and crisis will depend  on the willingness  of foreign 
banks  to  extend  additional  foreign  currency  lending  to  cover  the  payment  shortfalls  on  current 
commitments.  If they  follow  the  bankers’  aphorism,  they  may  be unwilling  to  do  this.  As  a result, 
firms  may be forced  to  attempt  to improve  their  foreign  earnings  by increasing  foreign  sales. But,  this 
usually  leads  to falling  prices  in international  markets  which  compounds  the  losses  from  depreciation 
of  the  exchange  rate,  and  any  cutback  in  domestic  operations  simply  makes  domestic  demand 
conditions  worse.  The  knock-on  effect  thus  hits  both  the  domestic  financial  system  and  the  foreign 
banks,  who  now  have  increasingly  dubious  loans  on their  books.  Ifboth  foreign  and  domestic  banks’ 
capital  cushion  is insufficient  to  absorb  the  losses,  then  fragility  turns  to  global  systemic  instability. 
In any  case,  the  initial  shock,  as well  as the  recommended  policies,  combine  to  increase  fragility  and 
thus  make  instability  possible  in any  exchange  rate  crisis. 
The  Asian  crisis  was  slightly  different,  since  most  Asian  countries  sit uneasily  between  two 
international  capital  markets:  Japan  and the  US.  Japan  is a major  creditor  to the  area.’  After  a period 
of  high  interest  rates  introduced  at  the  beginning  of the  decade  to  collapse  its  speculative  bubble, 
’ The  share  of Indonesia’s  long-term  debt  denominated  in Yen  is 38%,  for Malaysia  it is 40%, 
for  Thailand  53%,  and  for  the  Philippines  38%. 8 
Japanese  domestic  interest  rates  have  recently  been at historical  lows.  Likewise,  the  value  of the  Yen 
against  the  dollar  has  move  from  a high  of around  80 Yen/$  to  the  current  lows  of Yen  135.  Since 
most  of  the  Asian  countries  have  adopted  policies  of  stabilising  their  currencies  (this  does  not 
necessarily  mean  rigidly  fixed rates)  against  the  dollar  (or against  a currency  basket  in which  the  dollar 
is a major  component),  an appreciation  of  the  Yen  against  the  dollar  is also  an appreciation  relative 
to  Asia  and  represents  an increase  in Asian  domestic  currency  cash  flow  commitments  on borrowing 
from  Japan.  But  this  does  not  normally  create  a financing  problem,  since the  rise in the  value  of the 
debt  and  current  payments  commitments  is more  than  offset  by  Japanese  producers  increasing  the 
outsourcing  of  their  production  into  Asia  in response  to  their  loss  of  competitiveness.  This  is the 
famous  “hollowing  out”  of Japanese  manufacturing  industry,  and is visible  in the  large  foreign  direct 
investment  flows  into  Asia  earlier  in the  decade. 
However,  the  reversal  of the  trend  appreciation  of the  Yen  relative  to  the  dollar,  along  with 
historically  low  interest  rates,  has  meant  that  Japanese  investors  placing  short-term  funds  in Asia 
have  benefitted  from  both  a substantial  interest  rate  differential  and  a possible  exchange  rate  gain  as 
the  Yen  depreciated.  This  has  created  incentives  for  substantial  short-term  flows  from  the  Japanese 
financial  markets  as banks  and other  international  investors  borrow  short-term  funds  in Japan  and lend 
them  to Asian  banks  or firms.  Since the Yen had reached  an historic  peak  against  the  dollar,  there  was 
also  the  distinct  possibility  of profit  from  any  appreciation  of the  dollar.  These  flows  were  further 
supported  by the  creation  in  a number  of  countries,  Thailand  is an  example,  of  special  “offshore” 
financial  centres  to  increase  the  role  of  domestic  Asian  banks  in the  intermediation  of international 
capital  flows  in  the  region.’  These  made  it  easier  for  funds  to  be  borrowed  in  low-interest  rate 
markets,  such  as the  US,  and  invested  at higher  Asian  rates.  However,  these  facilities  did  not  retain 
a  sharp  division  from  domestic  money  markets  and  soon  became  a conduit  for  foreign  lending  to 
domestic  banks  and  caused  sharp  expansions  in domestic  lending.  Under  pressure  to  liberalise  their 
2 Japan  was  not  the  only  source  of  arbitrage  funding.  It was  also  profitable  to  borrow  funds 
in the  US  to  lend  in Asia,  as well  as within  Asia.  For  example,  the  crisis  in Indonesia  is reputed  to 
have  been  aggravated  by  Korean  investment  banks’  refusal  to  roll  over  lending  to  Indonesian 
corporates  that  they  were  funding  with  borrowing  in Hong  Kong.  Korean  investment  banks  also held 
substantial  positions  in Brazilian  “Brady”  bonds  and  Russian  government  bonds,  all financed  with 
funds  borrowed  in  international  markets.  This  is  one  of  the  reasons  why  the  crisis  had  such 
widespread  repercussions,  as far away  as Latin  American  and Eastern  Europe.  This  should  be  seen 
as anything  out  of the  ordinary  -  when  Poland  defaulted  on its debt  in  1982,  leading  to  the  1980s 
debt  crisis,  Brazil  was  one  of the  creditors. 9 
financial  markets,  many  countries  had  lifted  restrictions  on lending,  and with  manufacturing  industry 
showing  declining  profitability,  most  of  these  funds  went  into  the  more  “remunerative”  areas  of 
property  development  and  financial  speculation. 
This  increase  in  short-term  flows  tended  to  further  reinforce  the  strength  of  the  Asian 
currencies  and  to  further  decrease  their  competitiveness  relative  to  Japan,  making  them  even  more 
dependent  on sales to US  dollar  markets.  Thus  the  shift from  Yen  strength  and high  Japanese  interest 
rates  to Yen  weakness  and low  interest  rates  has helped  to bring  about  a shift from  long  to  short-term 
flows.  This created  a situation  in which  the  exchange  rates  were  being supported  by temporary  capital 
flows,  while  domestic  production  was  losing  competitivity  to Japan  and other  non-dollar  markets.  At 
the  same  time,  Asian  producers  were  being  challenged  by Chinese  entry  into  many  of their  labour- 
intensive  markets  and their  higher  technology  markets  were  rapidly  becoming  commoditized  as prices 
were  dropping  rapidly.  Thus,  the  strength  of  exchange  rates  did  not  really  reflect  the  underlying 
strength  of  competitivity  of  the  manufacturing  sector.  This  was  exhibited  by  the  deterioration  of 
foreign  balance  for  most  of the  Asian  countries  throughout  the  1990s. 
The market’s  attention  was  attracted  to the  diverse  behaviour  of the  real and financial  sectors 
when  the Bank  of Thailand  decided  not  to intervene  to rescue  the  country’s  largest  finance  company, 
Finance  One,  in  the  Spring  of  1997.  The  failure  took  on  special  importance  because  it  occurred 
against  the  background  of  increased  uncertainty  in  international  capital  markets  concerning  the 
evolution  of international  interest  rate  differentials.  In the  beginning  of May  1997,  the  view  that  the 
Japanese  economy  was  engaged  in a full-fledged  recovery  gained  increasing  support  (although  there 
was  virtually  no  hard  evidence  to  support  this belie?)  and there  was  a sharp  appreciation  of the  yen 
and  a sudden  rise in Japanese  short-term  interest  rates  on expectations  that  the  Bank  of Japan  would 
move  quickly  to  raise  its discount  rate.4 Politicians  who  had  long  been  pressing  the Bank  of Japan  to 
raise  interest  rates  (to  increase  the  interest  income  on  their  retired  constituents’  savings)  suddenly 
appeared  likely  to  succeed  and  market  opinion  quickly  shifted  towards  confident  expectations  of 
3 The  IMF  World  Economic  Outlook  for May  1997 gives  a forecast  for  real GDP  growth  of 
2.2%,  down  from  3.6%  the  previous  year  and  suggests  that  “recovery  is  likely  to  continue  at  a 
moderate  pace”  (p.  15). 
4 The  move  was  all the  more  important  because  it “was  of a magnitude  that  market 
participants  considered  quite  unlikely,  even  as late  as 5 May.  As the  yen  appreciated  rapidly 
between  5 May  and  9 May  (the  market)  began  to  reflect  a significant  probability  of large  further 
appreciations”  (IMF,  November  1997:  19). 10 
higher  Japanese  rates.  AS  a result,  fbnds  that  had  been  borrowed  at low  interest  rates  in Japan  and 
Hong  Kong,  and  invested  at substantially  higher  rates  in Asia, were  quickly  withdrawn  and  returned 
to  Japan,  supporting  the  appreciation  of the  yen  and  putting  increasing  pressure  on  Asian  reserves 
and  exchange  rates. 
These  two  factors  together  brought  a sharp reversal  of the  short-term  funds flowing  into  Asia, 
putting  pressure  on  exchange  rates.  Domestic  banks  in the  area  facing  a sudden  decline  in foreign 
funds  responded  by calling  in their  loans  to  domestic  companies,  primarily  in the  area  of real  estate 
and  financial  speculation.  Of course,  all this was  a false  alarm,  the  Japanese  economy  was  in fact  in 
a free  fall decline,  not  a rapid  recovery,  the  Bank  of Japan  had  no  intention  of increasing  rates  and 
the  Yen  quickly  reversed  direction  and  moved  back  towards  130 Yen  to  the  dollar. 
It  thus  seems  quite  clear  that  the  financial  crisis  in  Asia  is to  a large  extent  the  combined 
operation  of the  endogenous  and  exogenous  factors  cited  above.  The  fact  that  exchange  rates  had 
remained  generally  stable  relative  to  the  dollar  for  so long  clearly  led  to  a reduction  in margins  of 
safety  for both borrowers  and lenders,  domestic  and international.  And  it is clear that  this  stability  was 
self-reinforcing:  the  longer  exchange  rates  remained  stable,  the  higher  the  market  considered  the 
probability  that  they  would  remain  so; the  more  funds  international  investors  were  willing to  commit 
at lower  margins  of  safety  the  higher  were  foreign  exchange  reserves  which  appeared  to  increase 
margins  of safety.  The capital inflows  that  kept  the  currencies  stable thus  implicitly  increased  fragility. 
They  also  decreased  the  ability  to  finance  the  commitments  on  those  flows  by  reducing  the 
competitiveness  of manufacturing  exports. 
External  shocks  were  represented  by  the  volatility  of the  Yen-dollar  exchange  rate  and  the 
associated  changes  in relative  interest  rate  spreads  and the  flow  of arbitrage  funds  into  and  out  of the 
region,  which  put  increased  pressure  on  the  already  thin  and  declining  margins  of  safety.  Further, 
some  international  regulatory  factors  played  a  role.  When  Korea  joined  the  OECD,  Korean 
government  debt  took  on a special  zero-weight  status  and led to improved  rating  for all Korean  debt, 
which  encouraged  foreign  inflows  since  Korean  rates  were  substantially  higher  than  other  OECD 
country  rates. 5 
5 From  the  discussion  above  of  the  reinforcing  effect  of  interest  rate  and  exchange  rate 
changes,  it should  be  clear  that  banks  operating  in open  developing  countries  should  have  margins 
of safety  that  are higher  than  those  operating  in less open  developed  economies.  Yet,  the  application 
of  international  capital  requirements,  which  were  being  introduced  (and  were  being  met)  by  most 
banking  systems  in the  region,  apply  a uniform  minimum  capital  ratio. 11 
Once  the  reversal  of capital  flows  had  exposed  the  fragility  of the  existing  margins  of safety, 
this brought  attention  to a series of other  factors  which  had been  present  in the  market  for  some  time, 
including  a series  of prior  bank  failures  (in Indonesia  and  Thailand)  and  corporate  bankruptcies  (in 
Indonesia  and  Korea),  warnings  from  the  Bank  for  International  Settlements  and  rating  agencies, 
rising  real  exchange  rates,  and  current  account  deficits  that  had  been  higher  than  those  which  had 
brought  grief  to  Mexico  (Thailand  had  a current  account  deficit  over  8%  of  GDP  in  1995  as the 
Tequila  crisis  spread  through  Latin  America).  International  funds  started  to  be  withdrawn  from 
Thailand  and  there  were  a  series  of  contained  speculative  attacks  against  the  currency  that  were 
countered  by the  Bank  of  Thailand  operating  aggressively  and  successfully  in the  forward  foreign 
exchange  market.  Unfortunately,  it had  to  halt  this  policy  when  its forward  commitments  exceeded 
its reserves. 
The  central  banks  ofthe  region  first reacted  with  a concerted  policy  to defend  exchange  rates, 
but  after  the  Thai  baht was  devalued,  a number  of countries,  recognising  the  risk to  competitiveness 
of  remaining  linked  to  an  ever  stronger  dollar  and  fearing  contagion  of  the  speculative  currency 
attacks,  engaged  in a series  of  rapid  preemptive  devaluations  to  delink  from  the  dollar.  In the  space 
of  less  than  three  weeks,  Thailand,  Philippines,  Malaysia,  Singapore  and  Indonesia  gave  up 
exchanges  rates  that  had  been  stable  against  the  dollar  for  extended  periods.  The  aim  was  to 
discourage  speculators  and thereby  avoid  the increase  in interest  rates  that  would  have  been  required 
to  protect  the  currency.  But  in the  space  of three  weeks  the  movement  in exchange  rates  wiped  out 
the  already  insufficient  margins  of safety for domestic  banks  and  corporate  borrowers.  Thus  a policy 
which  seemed  sensible  from  the  point  of view  of international  currency  markets,  did  not  prove  to  be 
successful  domestically.  First,  it placed  both  firms  and  banks  in difficulty  for  the  reasons  already 
described  above.  Firms  and  banks  were  instantly  transformed  from  speculative  to  ponzi  enterprises. 
Second,  as  in  the  case  of  Mexico,  the  delinking  from  the  dollar  did  not  discourage,  but  rather 
encouraged,  speculators  and when  countries  did not  initially  respond  with  tighter  monetary  policies 
and  actions  to  cut  domestic  demand  the  markets  interpreted  this  as  unwillingness  to  take  strong 
measures  in defence  of their  currencies. 
However,  from  the  point  of view  of most  of these  countries,  and  with  the  support  of  IMF 
Article  IV consultations,  they  considered  themselves  to be dealing  from  positions  of strong  economic 
fundamentals  or  of  having  already  taken  the  measures  required  to  return  their  economies  to 
sustainable  positions.  Indeed,  most  had  government  budgets  in rough  balance  or  in  surplus,  their 12 
current  accounts  were  improving  (this  was  the  case  of  Malaysia,  Thailand  and  Korea)  from  their 
worst  levels  as  the  result  of  tighter  domestic  policies,  inflation  rates  were  contained  and  stable, 
growth  was  strong  and  most  were  taking  actions  to  bolster  their  banking  and  financial  systems  with 
the  help  and  express  approval  of the  IMF. 
Nonetheless,  as  currencies  failed  to  stabilise  interest  rates  were  raised  to  punitive  levels, 
reinforcing  the  negative  impact  of  the  exchange  rate  depreciation  on the balance  sheets  of both  firms 
and  banks.  At  this  point  the  elimination  of  margins  of  safety  rebounded  negatively  on  the  foreign 
exchange  rate  as both  banks  and  firms  sought  to  limit  the  damage  from  the  rising  dollar  and  rising 
interest  rates  by repaying  as rapidly  as possible  the outstanding  foreign  currency  debt.  Domestic  banks 
and  corporations  thus joined  the  speculators  in selling  the  domestic  currency  against  dollars.  But,  in 
difference  Corn Latin  American  crises,  this was  not  so much  a case of capital  flight  as simple  covering 
of  open  foreign  exchange  positions.  The  result  was  a free  fall in both  the  exchange  rate  and  asset 
prices  in  many  countries  as financing  units  sought  “to  make  position  by  selling  position”,  selling 
anything  possible  to  raise  funds  and  reduce  cash  payment  commitments  and  foreign  exposure.  A 
Minsky  debt-deflation  crisis,  or a Soros-type  reflexive  process,  thus  got  underway.  Unfortunately  it 
was  not  recognised  as such,  and  the  policies  that  were  implemented  actually  accentuated  the  crisis. 
-  What Is  To Be Done  -  What Has  Been  Done? 
What  would  have  been  required  to  avoid  a full scale debt  crisis is a debt  moratorium,  and then 
a debt  “workout”  in which  cash  flows  are rescheduled  on a sustainable  basis.  But,  such  a “workout” 
is only  possible  if the  deterioration  in the  cushion  of safety  is from  hedge  to  speculative  finance.  If all 
positions  have  become  ponzi positions,  the firms will all have  strictly  negative  net present  values,  and 
there  is  no  rescheduling  possible  which  can  resolve  the  problem.  To  prevent  cases  of  extended 
insolvency,  policy  must  act  to  try  to  stem  the  downward  spiral  while  firms  are  still in the  stage  of 
speculative  financing.  The  obvious  and  direct  way  to  do  this  is to  underpin  cash  flows  to  firms  by 
supporting  domestic  demand  and  by reducing  their  financing  costs,  either  through  debt  standstills  or 
reductions  in interest  rates.  This leaves  productive  capacity  in place  that  can increase  export  earnings 
to  repay  foreign  debt,  and  prevents  the  gridlock  of the  banking  system  caused  by generalised  non- 
payment,  default  and  credit  downgrades.  Hy  has  argued  in  favoured  of  such  “workout”  on  an 
international  scale  for  some  time. 
However,  when  the  IMF was called in to provide  support  for the  Asian  economies  it appears 13 
to  have judged  the  crises  to  have  been  caused  by imprudent  banking  practices  and  excessive  lending, 
leading  to  excessive  balance  of  payments  deficits.  IMF  support  conditions  were  centred  on  the 
improving  the  balance  of payments  and patterned  on the  previous  experience  in the  Mexican-Tequila 
crisis.  In  order  to  prevent  erosion  of the  devaluation  due  to  the  price  inflation  that  was  expected  to 
arise  from  the  increased  import  prices  and  the  increased  demand  from  the  bailouts  of the  banks,  and 
to  keep  imports  down,  domestic  demand  was  constrained  through  a  reduction  in  government 
expenditures  and  tight  monetary  targets.  To  further  cut  domestic  demand  and  stabilise  the 
devaluation,  interest  rates  were  raised.  Finally,  financial  institutions  that  did  not  meet  international 
capital  standards  were  ordered  closed  immediately  or  operations  suspended  pending  plans  for 
recapitalisation.  The  objective  of the  policy  was  to  restore  international  confidence  and  bring  about 
a return  of  short-term  capital  flows that would  make  the  actual  use  of the  IMF  and  other  conditional 
funding  from  the multilateral  agencies  or governments  unnecessary  at the  same time  as it laid the basis 
for  an increase  in exports  and  a reduction  in imports  which  would  eventually  make  capital  inflows 
unnecessary. 
However,  as noted  above,  the  collapse  of exchange  rates  had not been  due to banks  financing 
excess  demand  for  imported  consumption  goods,  but  rather,  financing  imports  of  capital  goods  by 
firms.  It was  the  firms’  and banks’  balance  sheets  that  had  to be supported.  The IMF  conditions  only 
made  their  positions  worse.  First,  the  flight  of  foreign  capital  meant  that  they  had  to  replace  their 
short-term  financing,  but  at  sharply  higher  rates  from  domestic  banks.  Second,  with  falling  global 
demand,  firms  became  increasingly  dependent  on  domestic  demand,  but  fiscal  policy  was  ensuring 
that  demand  would  be falling.  The  original  estimates  were  for  small  reduction  in growth.  All three 
IMF-assisted  countries  now  will be in full blown  recession  for  1998 and most  probably  through  1999. 
Thus,  firms  had  rising  short-term  financing  costs  and  collapsing  income  flows  to  meet  them.  Third, 
firms  that  had  borrowed  abroad  had  to  repay  foreign  lenders.  Given  the  long  period  of  relatively 
stable  exchange  rates,  much  of  this  borrowing  had  not  been  hedged,  and  thus  had  to  be  repaid  in 
foreign  currency.  But,  export  receipts  were  falling and the value in domestic  currency  was rising  daily. 
It was  originally  thought  that  the  sharp  devaluations  would  cause  an export  boom  similar  to  that  in 
Mexico.  However,  firms  could  no  longer  obtain  finance  to  purchase  imports  or meet  payrolls,  they 
thus  sold  position  to  make  position  and  started  to  sell  from  inventories.  Just  as  Minsky’s  debt 
deflation  theory  predicted,  the  result  was  a rapid  fall in the  export  prices,  while  import  prices  rose  in 
step  with  the  devaluation  of  the  currency.  Thus,  although  trade  balances  did  improve,  but  only 14 
because  there  were  no longer  any imports  and exports  were  dumped  in distress  so that  the  price  effect 
more  than  offset  any  quantity  impact,  leading  to  further  reductions  in  the  terms  of  trade  For 
example,  in Korea,  the  index  of export  prices  fell from  an average  of 72.4  in the  third  quarter  to  60 
in January,  the  lowest  level  since  1988. 
In addition,  tight  monetary  policies  caused  an increase  in trade  financing  costs.  Commission 
for letters  of credit  on domestic  transactions  in Korea  increased  from  0.065%  to 0.1%  and for foreign 
currency  transfers  increased  from  0.5-O. 1% to  0.3%.  Credit  lines  have  been  reduced  and  payment 
penalties  increased.  Thus,  the  export  capacity  of most  firms  was  constrained  by the  inability  of get 
finance  to  continue  current  operations.  Mexico  had not  experienced  these  problems,  first because  the 
majority  of its  debt  was  consumer  and  mortgage  debt,  and  second  because  the  majority  of  exports 
took  place  through  the  maquilladoras  that  did not  depend  directly  on the  domestic  financial  system. 
Of  course,  these  policies  are  exactly  the  opposite  of what  was  required  from  the  point  of 
view  of stopping  a Minsky  debt-deflation  crisis.  The  conditions  imposed  by the  IMF  considered  the 
crisis  as a flow  problem  -  imports  were  greater  than  exports,  and  tried  to  slow  the  first  flow  and 
accelerate  the  second  on  the  expectation  that  a current  account  surplus  along  with  capital  inflows 
attracted  by  high  interest  rates  would  stabilise  the  exchange  rate.  But,  the  problem  was  a  stock 
problem,  as firms  and banks  tried  to liquidate  their  stocks  of goods  and assets  to liquidate  their  stocks 
of foreign  exchange  debts6  In Keynesian  terms  it was  a problem  of a shift in liquidity  preference,  not 
a problem  of  a shift  in spending  propensities  that  had  to  be achieved. 
Thus,  international  investors  reacted  rationally,  noting  that  a slowdown  in domestic  demand 
could  only worsen  the  cash flows  of firms,  while  the increase  in interest  rates  could  only worsen  their 
financing  costs.  Since  import  prices  would  rise and  export  prices  would  in all likelihood  fall it would 
become  more  difficult  to  earn  foreign  currency  to  repay  foreign  debt.  The  default  on  domestic  debt 
would  make  it more  difficult  for  the  banks  to  finance  current  production  to  be  sold  for  export  and 
make  it more  difficult  to repay  foreign  borrowing.  Further,  the  decision  to close  banks  meant  freezing 
all existing  financial  arrangements.  Solvent  banks  would  be unable  to recover  any ofthe  funds  (partial 
payment  is always  better  than  no repayment  at all) lent to suspended  banks,  and thus  would  be in even 
greater  difficulty.  The  IMF  conditions  thus  aggravated  the  financial  fragility  and  initiated  a  debt 
deflation  process  that  meant  the  crisis  would  be prolonged  and  have  substantially  greater  costs  in 
6  Korean  conglomerate  carry  debt  ratios  of from  400%  to 700%,  a large  portion  ofwhich  had 
become  short-term  and  foreign  funded,  either  directly  or indirectly,  over  the  last  five years. 15 
terms  of bankruptcy  and  unemployment. 
The  market’s  implicit  recognition  that  this was  a “debt  deflation”  crisis  and  not just  a “debt” 
crisis  may  be seen  in the  pressure  on the  Hong  Kong  currency  and  asset  markets.  According  to  any 
definition  of  economic  “fundamentals”,  there  was  little  reason  to  expect  difficulty  in Hong  Kong, 
either  in  the  asset  market  or  in  the  foreign  exchange  market.  Hong  Kong  has  already  had  its 
experience  with  fraudulent  trading  and  overexposed  banks  in  the  1987  stock  market  break.  Its 
banking  system  is  regulated  on  standards  that  are  at  least  equivalent  to  British  standards.  The 
currency  is backed  by  a currency  board  holding  US  dollars  in an  amount  that  covers  not  only  the 
circulating  HK  dollar  notes,  but  all sight  deposits,  by a substantial  multiple.  Thus  every  HK  dollar, 
and  deposit  created  by banks  lending  HK  dollars  for  speculation,  could  be redeemed  in US  dollars 
and  there  would  still  be  something  left  over.  Beyond  that,  China  holds  US  dollar  assets  that  are 
approximately  three  times  as large  as the Hong  Kong  Monetary  Authority’s  holdings.  Thus,  the Hong 
Kong  banks  were  not  at  risk,  nor  was  the  HK  dollar.  The  cushions  of  safety  of  the  banks  were 
substantially  higher  than  the  minimum  that  was  suggested  by the  International  Risk-based  Capital 
Standards.  Nonetheless,  both  the  Hong  Kong  stock  market  and  the  HK  dollar  came  under  heavy 
selling  pressure  that  precipitated  the  October  27  sell  off  in  other  developed  markets.  Market 
Irrationality?  Seen  in the  context  of  a Minsky  crisis,  not  at all. The  key  again  is the  movement  of 
rates.  If there  is full conversion  of HK  dollar  liabilities  into US  dollars, there  should  be no  impact  on 
the  exchange  rate.  However,  if the  HKMA  is forced  to  convert  substantial  amounts  of HK  dollars, 
this  puts  direct  pressure  on  domestic  money  market  interest  rate.  Higher  domestic  rates  will  raise 
financing  costs,  and  thus  put  pressure  on  construction  companies  and  property  developers,  as well 
as the  banks  that  finance  them.  These  are the  companies  that  make  up  the  majority  of  shares  in the 
Hong  Kong  stock  market.  Further,  higher  interest  rates  increase  the carrying  cost for borrowed  stock. 
Thus,  any  pressure  on the  currency,  even  if successfully  resisted,  would  instantly  place  pressure  on 
stock  prices  as  investors  sold  out  position  and  property  companies  sought  to  raise  liquidity  by 
marking  down  prices.  After  the  decision  of  the  Taiwanese  government  to  devalue  the  Taiwanese 
dollar  international  investors  quite  naturally  looked  for  signs  of weakness  or hesitancy  in defense  of 
the  Hong  Kong  dollar.  It  thus  became  impossible  for  Hong  Kong  (until  then  the  only  country 
untouched  by the  crisis) not  to make  a pre-emptive  response  by increasing  interest  rates.  For  a foreign 
investor,  there  was  thus  a near  certainty  that  eventually  either  the  Hong  Kong  dollar  would  come 
under  pressure  if interest  rates  were  not  raised,  or the  IX  MA  would  be forced  to  increase  interest rates  preemptively.  If this  prevented  the  anticipated  depreciation  of the  currency  it would  be  at the 
cost  of  a sharp  fall  in the  stock  market.  Thus,  even  if an  investor  could  be  sure  of  exchange  rate 
stability,  he  could  also  be  virtually  certain  of  stock  price  instability  and  falling  domestic  property 
prices.  There  was  thus  no  way  to  avoid  a loss  on  holdings  in Hong  Kong,  and  after  the  losses 
sustained  in other  Asian  markets,  investors  sold  out  of the  one  market  with  perfect  fundamentals  on 
a perfectly  rational  understanding  of  the  difference  between  stock  imbalances  and  flow  imbalances. 
-  Is the Crisis  Over? 
If the  analysis of the crisis as a Minsky  debt  deflation  rather  than  a simple  balance  of payments 
crisis  is  correct  then  the  response  is no,  the  crisis  is  not  over  and  the  success  of  IMF  policies  in 
restoring  external  short-term  flows  of funds  will not be sufficient  to resolve  the  crisis.  This is because, 
at currently  prevailing  exchange  rates,  as mentioned  above,  most  firms  are  still insolvent.  The  short- 
term  paper,  issued  by the  firms  and held by the banks  has simply  been  rolled  over.  If the  restructuring 
of the  banking  system  proceeds  these  credits  will become  non-performing  and  the  firms  will  be  in 
default.  Thus,  even  in the  case  of Korea,  where  an international  debt  rollover  has  been  arranged  to 
resolve  the  dollar  shortage  for the  current  year, the problem  ofthe  outstanding  corporate  commercial 
paper  held  by the  commercial  banks  remains.  Further,  the  debt  resolution  has  simply  been  pushed  to 
the  future.  The  Korean  Institute  of Finance  predicts  that  starting  in 200 1 these  debts will start coming 
due  and will represent  annual  interest  charges  of around  $10 billion.  Further  the  reported  commercial 
paper  holdings  of the  best  capitalised  banks  represents  about  2% of equity.  For  other  banks  it will be 
substantially  higher.  Most  of  this  paper  was  rolled  over  as  the  crisis  broke  at  the  beginning  of 
December  and  has again  been  rolled  over  in March.  Since  most  is expected  to  be in default,  any real 
restructuring  of the  banks  will have  to  write  these  loans  off as total  loss.  Further,  a large  percentage 
of  the  loans  are  held  by  Japanese  banks,  and  these  may  have  to  be  recalled  if Japan  continues  to 
encounter  the  clear  symptoms  of incipient  debt  deflation.  In Indonesia,  there  has been  little  need  for 
a  roll  over  in  order  to  provide  dollar  balances  as  Indonesian  dollar  reserves  appear  more  than 
sufficient.  The  problem  is that  firms  cannot  afford  to purchase  the dollars  that  they  need  to repay  their 
debts  and remain  solvent.  Unless  the  exchange  rate returns  to more  normal  levels,  they  will eventually 
have  to  cease  operations.  It  is interesting  to  note  that  the  rates  that  were  being  quoted  when  the 
creation  of  a currency  board  was  under  discussion  of  5,500-6,000  Rupiah  are  rates  at which  most 
major  corporate  borrowers  are  considered  solvent. 17 
Thus,  there  is a second  stage  of the  crisis  still to  be  played  out  involving  the  recognition  of 
the  powi  nature  of  most  of productive  enterprise  and the  associated  downward  adjustment  of  their 
valuations.  The  same  will  be  true  of  the  banks  holding  the  firms’  short-term  debts.  Although  the 
external  financing  crisis  has  been  stemmed,  the  internal  financing  crisis  still remains  to  be  resolved. 
As an order  ofmagnitude,  at the  end  of  1996 the  won/$  exchange  rate  was  844,  short-term  interest 
rates  were  12.2%,  and  three-year  corporate  bonds  bearing  a bank  guarantee  paid  12.6%.  After 
touching  2000,  the  exchange  rate  at the  end  of January  was  around  1800 and  overnight  interest  rates 
are  25%  and  three  year  rates  21.2%.  At  the  beginning  of  April  the  exchange  rate  is around  1400, 
overnight  interest  rates  are around  22%  and three-year  around  19%. Thus  despite  the claims that the 
situation  has  stabilised,  firms  are facing  both  exchange  rates  and  interest  rates  have  increased  by 75 
to 90% respectively,  after  having  roughly  doubled  from  November  to end December.  This means  that 
financing  costs  have  roughly  doubled  in won  terms,  while  the  domestic  value  of foreign  indebtedness 
is about  three  quarters  higher,  for about  a three-fold  increase  in the  interest  charge  on cash  flows  and 
on  outstanding  foreign  indebtedness.  This  is far beyond  any plausible  margins  of safety. 
The  first  step  in the  third  phase  of the  crisis will then  be to  restore  stability  to  asset  markets, 
which  means  having  both  buyers  and  sellers,  borrowers  and  lenders.  This  will  allow  producers  to 
increase  exports  and  the  process  of adjustment  to  begin.  However,  much  of the  productive  capacity 
will  in fact  be  closed  by bankruptcy.  And  the  fall in prices  will be less  than  the  change  in exchange 
rates  due  to  the  fact  that  most  Asian  exports  are import-intensive,  so that  import  costs  will be rising 
in dollar  terms,  and  domestic  costs  will  also  be rising  as the  impact  of depreciation  on the  domestic 
price  level works  through  to domestic  costs.  It is also likely that  capital  flows will also return,  through 
foreign  purchases  of  domestic  productive  capacity  (to  operate  or  to  close,  as  occurred  in  East 
Germany).  It is for this  reason  that  it is difficult  to  determine  appropriate  exchange  rates.  At  current 
exchange  rates,  this  process  should  be extremely  rapid,  and will certainly  bring  calls from  developed 
countries,  swamped  with  imports,  for protection  measures.’  This would  preclude  adjustment  via the 
expansion  of net  exports  and  leave  only  the  restoration  of capital  flows  of the  original  IMF  design. 
But,  this implies  increasing  reliance  on high interest  rates  and/or  the  sale of domestic  assets  at cut rate 
prices.  Neither  of which  are  capable  of curing  the  current  debt  deflation. 
‘Up  to the present,  US semiconductor  manufacturers,  such as Micron,  European  shipbuilders, 
such  as  Fincantieri,  and  numerous  Japanese  and  Latin  American  producers  have  threatened  anti- 
dumping  measures  in WTO  or to  unilaterally  impose  tariffs  on  goods  from  Asia. 18 
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